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Abstract 
We explore computational approaches for 
artificial agents to play the ultimatum game.  We 
compare our agents’ behavior with that 
predicted by classical game theory, as well as 
behavior found in experimental (or behavioral) 
economics investigations. In particular, we study 
the following questions: How do artificial agents 
perform in playing the ultimatum game against 
fixed rules, dynamic rules, and rotating rules? 
How do coevolving artificial agents perform? 
Will learning software agents do better? What is 
the value of intelligence? What will happen when 
smart learning agents play against dumb (no-
learning) agents? What will be the impact of 
agent memory size on performance? We provide 
some initial experimental results pertaining to 
these questions.  
 
1. Introduction 
The ultimatum game has been widely accepted in 
the study of bargaining and negotiation.  
(Subsequently, we will not distinguish these very 
similar concepts.) For example, any trading rule 
can be characterized as a negotiation over how to 
split the surplus resulting from a trade (see e.g., 
Croson 1996).  There has been a recent growing 
interest in the ultimatum game by game theorists, 
economists, psychologists, and computer 
scientists, among others (Binmore, Gale and 
Samuelson 1995; Bolton and Zwick 1995; 
Burnell, Evans and Yao 1999; Güth 1995; Huck 
1999; Kagel, Kim, and Moser 1996; Knez and 
Camerer 1995; Roth et al. 1991; Ruffle 1998; 
Straub and Murnighan 1995). The importance of 
understanding the ultimatum game extends 
beyond purely scientific considerations. It is 
important as well from an e-commerce 
applications perspective: if we are to field 
intelligent, (semi-) autonomous agents in 
conducting bargaining and negotiation in virtual 
communities (such as in Internet markets), much 
remains to be learned about the principles of 
design and management of such artificial agents 
(Kimbrough and Wu 2001). We have conducted 
a series of investigations into the dynamics of 
agents, having varying degrees of intelligence, in 
strategic situations (or games). These 
investigations grew out of, and advance, our 
previous studies of the dynamics of game-
playing agents. Strategic situations are 
ubiquitous. How do and how can learning, 
deliberating, adaptive agents perform in strategic 
situations? How do their performances compare 
with those of strategy-centric agents?  How well 
do different identity-centric agents, using various 
learning and adaptation regimes, fare against one 
another in strategic situations? How well do 
various adaptive mechanisms perform when 
playing with humans? Are there simple adaptive 
mechanisms whose play behavior maps well to 
that of human subjects?  
 
Despite its simplicity, the ultimatum game 
presents a challenge in understanding negotiation 
behavior by humans. The relevant literature can 
be roughly divided into two approaches for 
addressing the ultimatum game: the classical 
game theory approach and the experimental 
economics (or behavioral) approach. The 
simplest version of the ultimatum game is as 
follows. Two players, A and B, must decide how 
to split N dollars. At the beginning of each play 
of the game, Player A decides how much x ∈ [0, 
N] dollars to offer to player B. Player B can 
reject the offer, resulting in both of the players 
getting nothing; or player B can accept the offer, 
in which case he gets the x dollars and player A 
keeps the rest N-x dollars. For simplicity, we 
assume x to be integer only. Figure 1 shows the 
extensive form of the game. 
 
Classical game theory asserts that any rational 
Player A should offer a tiny amount, say for 
example, one penny out of one dollar, to Player 
B, and player B will always accept this tiny 
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offer. This outcome is indeed sub-game perfect. 
(It passes the Nash Equilibrium test for every sub 
game, i.e., sub-trees in the extensive form). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The ultimatum game in extensive 
form. 
 
Further, there exits an infinite number of Sub-
Game Perfect Equilibria in this game (Skyrms 
1996), they are along the line of x + y = N, 
although the classical game theory is silent as to 
which Nash Equilibrium will be finally selected 
and used to predict the human behavior. Given 
this weakness in terms of prediction, it is not 
surprising that experimental economists found 
that classical game theory predictions (e.g., the 
penny equilibrium) were not supported by 
empirical evidence when human subjects were 
playing the ultimatum game. On the contrary, 
humans when playing the game in various lab 
settings, tend to reject offers that do not meet 
their threshold amounts of share (e.g., Croson 
1996; Kagel, Kim and Moser 1996; Roth et al. 
1991). These findings, independently conducted 
by a number of researchers (some even consider 
cultural differences), were consistent, thus 
credible. Various explanations and theories have 
been offered for the deviations from what 
classical game theory would predict (e.g., Bolton 
and Zwich 1995; Burnell, Evans and Yao, 1999).   
 
We conducted an initial, but systematic, 
investigation of play by adaptive agents, agents 
that form and adjust their strategies in response 
to experience.  The general framework for such 
agents is reinforcement learning in the machine 
learning literature (Sutton and Barto 1998). Here 
we explore computational approaches for 
artificial agents to play the ultimatum game, 
comparing our results with the classical game 
theoretical as well as the experimental (or 
behavioral) economics approaches. In particular, 
we study the following questions: How do 
artificial agents perform in playing the ultimatum 
game against fixed rules, dynamic rules, and 
rotating rules? How do coevolving artificial 
agents behave? Will learning software agents do 
better? What does intelligence do to benefit its 
holders? What will happen when smart learning 
agents play against dumb (no-learning) agents? 
What will be the impact of agent memory size on 
performance? We provide some initial computer 
simulation results to these questions.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 outlines our key research 
methodologies and implementation details. 
Section 3 reports our experimental findings. 
Section 4 reports further experiments in order to 
study the value of intelligence and the impact of 
memory size on agent performance. Section 5 
summarizes and discusses future research.   
 
2. Methodology and Implementations 
In our framework, artificial agents are modeled 
as finite automata (Hopcroft and Ullman 1979; 
Wolfram 1994). This framework has been 
adopted by a number of previous investigators. 
Among them, Binmore and Samuelson (1992), 
Sandholm and Crites (1995) and many others 
used the framework to study iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma (IPD). Kimbrough, Wu and Zhong 
(2001) used it to study the MIT “Beer Game”, 
where genetic learning artificial agents played 
the game and managed a linear supply chain. Wu 
and Sun (2002) investigate the electronic market 
off-equilibrium behavior of artificial agents in a 
price and capacity bidding game using genetic 
algorithms (Holland 1992).  These are merely 
samples to illustrate the validity of this 
framework in the literature. See Kimbrough and 
Wu (2001) for a survey.   
 
In this study, however, we depart from previous 
computational research by integrating several 
previous stranded approaches. First, we study a 
different game, namely the ultimatum game, 
rather than other games such as the IPD, Beer, 
Trust, Investment games. Second, in studying 
this game we use evolutionary computation to 
model agents. This contrasts with the standard 
approaches. Third, our agents are using 
reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto 1998) 
as a key learning mechanism in game playing 
while previous studies of the ultimatum game 
employ no machine learning. Finally, our agents 
are identity-centric rather than strategy-centric as 
used in previous studies (e.g., Kimbrough, Wu 
and Zhong 2002; Wu and Sun 2002).  That is, 
our agents may meaningfully be said to have 
A
x 
B
    (N-x, x)          (0,0) 
    Accept Reject 
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individual identities and behavior.  They are not 
just naked strategies that play and succeed or 
fail.  Individuals, rather than populations as a 
whole, learn and adapt over time and with 
experience.  Fielding these kinds of agents, we 
believe, is needed for e-commerce applications. 
 
We now describe our model and prototype 
implementations in more detail, using the 
framework of reinforcement learning. We 
discuss how the rules or state-action pairs are 
embedded in our artificial agents, how the 
rewards were set up, the long-term goal of the 
game (returns), the specific reinforcement 
learning algorithm we designed, and finally our 
code design using Java. 
 
Rules (State-Action Pairs) In repeated games, 
each game will be treated as an episode. So 
within any episode, player A only needs to make 
a decision at the beginning, and it is in only 
one state during the episode. Keeping things 
simple, we do not need a parameter to identify 
states, so the rules for player A only include the 
action part, which is how much to offer to player 
B. The value function is simple: 
Q(a) where a ∈ [0,N] 
For player B, the action part is either to accept or 
to reject, and the state part will the amount 
offered by player A. So, we have: a ∈ {Accept, 
Reject} and s ∈ [0,N].  
 
Rewards: Both of the players get their rewards 
at the end of each episode. The reward for player 
A by taking action a will be: 
  N-a  when player B accepts 
 ra(a) =  
0  when player B rejects 
 
and the reward for player B will be 
 
    0      when player B rejects 
rb (s, a) =            
      s      when player B accepts 
 
The value for each state-action pair is simply the 
average of its rewards during the previous 
episodes. (Thus the players assume their 
opponents are playing a stationary strategy.) The 
value will be updated each time a state-action 
pair is visited. 
 
Returns: The long-term return is the total payoff 
each player gets by playing the game repeatedly. 
 
Reinforcement Learning: There are two steps 
in each episode and one decision point for each 
agent. The decision-making at each point is 
according to the values of the suitable Q(s, a) 
and an ε-greedy policy. With probability 1-ε the 
agent chooses the available action that has the 
highest Q(s, a) value, and with probability ε the 
agent chooses randomly and uniformly among 
the other available actions. The pseudo code for 
the algorithm is: 
 
Initialize Q(s, a) = 0 for both agents 
Repeat (for each episode) 
Player A: choose a using ε-greedy policy 
Player A: takes action 
Player B: observe its state (s = a) 
Player B: choose a’ from s using ε-greedy policy 
Players A and B: get their rewards r and r’ and   
update their value functions. 
QA(a) <- QA(a)*(n-1)/n + r/n 
QB(s, a’) <- QB(s, a’)*(n-1)/n + r’/n 
(where n is the total number that the state-      
action pair has been visited) 
Until k episodes have been played. 
 
Java Coding: In the first experiment, the 
endowment of player A is set to 63, so its rules 
as encoded in a binary string have 6 positions, 
and consequently the rules for player B have 
6+1=7 positions. Model parameters, such as the 
length of rules for both agents, ε, endowment 
and the number of episodes to play etc. can be 
read in from input files. The results of each 
episode are written into a plain text file. 
  
3. Experiment Results 
The artificial agents play a series of ultimatum 
games, first the repeated one-shot game, second 
against fixed rules, third against dynamic rules, 
fourth against rotating rules, and finally against 
another agent also coevolving under 
reinforcement learning.  
 
3.1. Repeated One-Shot Game  
In the initial experiment, there is no memory for 
either agent, i.e. the agents make their decisions 
regardless of the opponent’s last move. Under 
the current algorithm design, the agents tend to 
find the game-theoretic result of the ultimatum 
game, in which player A only offers a tiny 
amount. The simulation has been multiply rerun 
using the above configuration and the conclusion 
was found to be statistically valid. Each time it 
converges to a different small number less than 
10. As for player B, the dominant strategy is to 
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accept. Table 1 is a partial list of the experiment 
results. 
Table 1: A partial list of the results. 
Episode 
No. 
A’s 
offer 
A’s 
payoff 
B’s 
action 
B’s 
payoff 
1 19 0 0 0 
2 6 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 
4 37 26 1 37 
5 37 52 1 74 
… 
486 3 22946 1 5215 
487 44 22965  5259 
488 3 23025 1 5262 
… 
500 3 23685 1 5295 
 
 
The results are robust to increases in the 
endowments, such as 127, 255 or 1023, with a 
larger number of episodes. 
 
These results are not unexpected. Since we set 
the reward of a reject action by player B to zero, 
and a number greater than zero when player B 
chooses to play accept, and since the agents have 
no memory of previous play, accepting will be 
the better action under any circumstance. Given 
B almost always chooses accept, it is better for 
player A to offer only a small amount. Changing 
the rewards assigned to player B in a way to 
favor the reject action when the offer from player 
A is relatively low will change the results of the 
experiments.  
 
3.2. Learning Agent Against Fixed Rules 
Here, the strategies of player B are fixed and 
punishment is introduced, so that when the last 
offer from player A is no greater than the current 
offer, player B will accept it, and otherwise 
reject it. Furthermore, a certain degree of 
tolerance can be adopted by player B, so that 
when the proportion of the current offer from 
player A to the endowment is greater than a 
certain number p, e.g. 0.8, then B will accept it, 
otherwise reject it. 
 
IF (currentOffer >= p* Endowment) 
Accept currentOffer 
ELSE 
Reject currentOffer. 
 
where p is a model parameter that is defined in 
the model parameters configuration file. 
 
For player A, if player B accepts his last offer, he 
will propose an offer no greater than his last 
offer, i.e. suppose player A proposed d t-1  in the 
t-1 time period, then at time t, he will make a 
selection  dt ∈ [0, d t-1]. 
 
Cooperation emerged. In our experiment where p 
= .40, player A converges on a proposal of 
p*Endowment = 40 when the endowment is 100.  
In other words, player A is capable of learning 
the policy of player B from iterated games.  
 
3.3. Learning Agent Against Dynamic Rules 
The lower limit (p) of player B is changing as the 
game is being played. The values and the time of 
the change are fixed. Table 2 shows the values of 
p and the occurrence of the adjustment. The first 
row of Table 2 indicates the number of episodes 
when a change occurs.  
Table 2: The values of p in different episodes. 
 1 2000 5000 7000 10000 
p 0.40 0.35 0.45 0.60 0.40 
 
Agent A can track the change very well given 
enough time periods. 
 
3.4. Learning Agent Against Rotating Rules 
The lower limit (p) of player B is changing with 
a rotating pattern, say  
pt-1 = .40, pt = .50, pt+1 = .60. 
We want to see if player A can track such a 
pattern. 
 
With our current reinforcement learning 
algorithm, player A converges to a proposal of 
60 which is the highest value of p * 100. 
Memory of at least one previous move should be 
introduced to the algorithm of player A in order 
for A to track the rotated rules of player B.  
 
3.5. Learning Simultaneously 
There are no fixed rules for either player A or 
player B. They will learn to find good solutions 
for themselves. 
 
In this experiment, both players have memory of 
their last action. For player A, the state in the 
time t period, is player B’s response in t-1 
period: 
Sat = bt-1 
The action of player A in time t is still a proposal 
of the ultimatum, dt ∈ [0, N]. 
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For player B, the state in time t period has two 
parameters – the last offer from player A, and his 
own response in the time t-1 period: 
Sbt = f (dt-1, bt-1) 
According to the state signals, player B chooses 
his lower limit by which he decides whether or 
not to accept the proposal from A. The decision-
making process for player B can be described as 
follows: 
IF bt –1 is “accept” 
  THEN 
lt = dt-1 
ELSE 
lt ∈ [0, N]. 
 
The above decision-making process of player A 
and B is modeled in Figure 2 using finite 
automata: 
 
Agent A:  
                                                                            
 
                                                     
 
                                                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agent B: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Decision-making processes for 
indefinite ultimatum game. In the lower 
diagram, “C” means agent A cooperated in t - 1, 
i.e. agent A’s proposal in t-1 was accepted by 
agent B; and “D” means agent A defected in t – 
1, i.e. agent A’s proposal in t – 1 was rejected by 
agent B. 
 
The meanings of Figure 2 are the following. As 
shown in the top part of the diagram, Agent A 
starts with a random choice of a possible 
proposal d ∈ [0, N]. If the proposal is accepted, 
agent A will choose the best amount to propose 
according to the value of Q(sa, d) where sa = 1 
(means accept), and continue doing so as long as 
agent B accepts the proposal. Otherwise, agent A 
will choose the best amount to propose 
according to the value of Q(sa, d) where sa = 0 
(means reject), and continue doing so until B 
accepts. 
 
In the meantime, as depicted in the lower part of 
the diagram, Agent B starts with a random 
choice of its lower limit l  - acceptable offer. If 
agent A cooperates, i.e. its offer exceeds this 
lower limit, agent B will set his lower limit the 
same as agent A’s last offer and continue doing 
do as long as agent cooperates. Otherwise if 
agent A decreases its offer (we denote this state 
as sb), then agent B will set l ∈ [0, N] to a new 
value that maximizes Q(sb, l), until agent A gets 
back to propose an acceptable offer. 
 
Now we describe the experimental results. 
Cooperation emerges through co-evolution 
within 2000 episodes. Player A converges to an 
offer of 55 or 56, and correspondingly, player B 
converges to setting his lower limit at 55 or 56.  
Some open questions arise from this experiment: 
Why does it converge at 55 and 56 instead of 50? 
Does the result depend on the initial random 
choices? We leave this for future theoretical 
exploration. 
 
4. Further Experiments 
We now describe further experiments to 
investigate the value of intelligence and the 
impact of memory size on agent behavior. The 
questions we are interested in are the following. 
Will learning software agents do better? What 
good does intelligence do for the agents having 
it? What will happen when smart learning agents 
play against dumb (no-learning) agents? 
 
 
4.1. Value of Intelligence 
We conducted two experiments to investigate the 
value of intelligence. In the first experiment (4a), 
we have one smart (learning) agent and many 
dumb (no-learning, fixed rule) agents. In the 
second experiment (4b), we have a population of 
two types of smart agents and many dumb 
agents. The goal of these investigations is to 
characterize the value of intelligence, i.e., 
whether smart agents would be able to do better 
through learning. 
      D 
     D 
C 
        D 
 l l = d 
 l* 
    C 
C
Reject 
Reject 
Accept 
Reject 
d d*
d*b 
Accept
Accept 
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One Smart Agent vs. Multiple Dumb Agents 
(4a) 
In 4(a), we have three types of dumb agents 
using different fixed rules. Without loss of 
generality, we assume the following three rules 
are being used: 
db1: demand/accept 70 or higher;  
db2: demand/accept 50 or higher;  
db3: demand/accept 30 or higher. 
 
There is a certain possibility (e.g. 25%) that a 
smart agent can be chosen to play the game. We 
shall keep a running total of the smart agent’s 
points. The smart agent can learn via 
reinforcement learning. We would like to see if 
this smart or learning agent would be able to 
learn a generally good or reasonable policy.  We 
note here that in designing this learning agent, 
we have to track the changing population of 
dumb agents. In each generation, the experiment 
proceeds as follows:  
1. Draw one smart agent with 25 percent 
possibility; otherwise draw one dumb 
agent randomly in proportion to their 
frequency 
2. Draw another dumb agent randomly in 
proportion to their frequency 
3. Decide the role of each agent, i.e. 
proposer vs. responder 
4. Two agents play the game against each 
other 
5. Record the results 
6. Go to the first step until a certain 
number of games, e.g. 1000 episodes, 
has been played 
7. Update the frequency of the dumb agent 
based on observed results of the current 
or previous time periods.   
  
When a smart agent is chosen to play the game, 
he will use reinforcement learning to decide how 
much to propose or the minimum amount he 
would accept.  
 
The results of this experiment show that the fair 
agents who propose 50 and accept any amount 
greater or equal to 50 take over the dumb agent 
population generation by generation. Figure 3 
illustrates such a trend. On the other hand, the 
smart agents also learn to be fair. Figure 4 
illustrates the evolution of the rules one smart 
agent chose in the experiment, as well as its 
average point score in each generation, as an 
indicator of its performance. Although this 
evolution procedure is different for different 
smart agents, the graph depicts the aggregate 
behavior and performance of the smart agent 
population.  
Frequencies of Dumb Agents
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 9 17 25 33 41 49 57 65 73 81 89 97
Generation
Fr
eq
.
Greedy
Agents
Fair
Agents
Generous
Agents 
 
Figure 3: Dynamics of the frequencies of 
dumb agents. Parameters used for this 
experiment are: Number of generations =100, 
number of plays in each generation = 2000, 
population size of smart agents = 20, population 
size of dumb agents = 90. 
Actions and Performances of One Smart 
Agent
0
10
20
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40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Generation
Am
ou
nt
Proposal
Response
Avg.
Rewards
 
Figure 4: Evolution procedure of the rules 
used by one smart agent in the smart agent 
population. 
 
Multiple Smart Agents and Dumb Agents (4b) 
In 4(b), we introduce a population of smart 
agents playing against many dumb agents, and 
playing against each other as well. Table 3 
explains our experimental design. Again, we 
assume the dumb agents fall into the above three 
types.  
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Table 3: Experimental design of 4b. 
  Responder 
  Smart (y) Dumb (1-y) 
Smart 
(x) 
  
Proposer Dumb 
(1-x) 
  
 
 
With the same population sizes of smart and 
dumb agents, the frequency of fair agents 
increases very slowly. This process is not very 
smooth for the first 30 generations. We observed 
decreasing points in this period. Figure 5 shows 
the evolving process of the frequency of dumb 
agents within 100 generations.  
 
Frequencies of Dumb Agents
0.25
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0.39
0.41
0.43
1 9 17 25 33 41 49 57 65 73 81 89 97
Generation
Fr
eq
.
Greedy
Fair
Generous
 
Figure 5: Dynamics of the frequencies of 
dumb agents when smart agents can play 
against each other. 
 
Again, the behavior and performance of one 
smart agent is illustrated in Figure 6 to portray 
the evolution procedure of the overall smart 
agent population. Figure 7 depicts the 
distribution of the average points of smart 
agents. 
Actions and Performances of One Smart Agent
0
10
20
30
40
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60
70
80
90
100
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Figure 6: Evolution procedure of the rules 
used by one smart agent in the smart agent 
population while smart agents can play 
against each other. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the average of points earned 
by different types of agent in 4a and 4b. Again, 
the difference between 4a and 4b is that in the 
latter, the smart agent could play against another 
smart agent while in the former case, the smart 
agent only meet with dumb agents (although 
there are three types of them). It is clear that in 
either case, smart agents and fair agents are 
doing well, while greediness or generosity do not 
pay. On the other hand, if smart agent plays with 
another smart agent, then the average points of 
the smart agent as well as the fair agent decrease 
a bit  - making unusual profit becomes more 
difficult, other types of agents (the greedy and 
the generous ones pick up a bit). In a sense, the 
distribution of wealth in this community or 
society becomes a bit “fairer” due to the policy 
of allowing smart agents to play with smart 
agents.   
 
Table 4: Average points of the agents at the 
end of 100th generation. 
Average Points  
Experiment 
4a 
Experiment 
4b 
Smart Agents 40.1 30.2 
Greedy Agents 19.9 25.0 
Fair Agents 43.8 35.1 
Generous Agents 20.6 25.1 
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Figure 7: Distribution of the average points of 
smart agents. 
 
4.2. Impact of Memory Size 
Table 5 summarizes our findings on the impact 
of memory size on agent performance. Where 
there is only one learning agent (5a), clearly 
longer memory size helps. Where there are 
multiple learning agents (5b), and when both 
have longer memory size, the payoff decreases a 
bit, while the dumb guys pick up. In any case, it 
turns out the identity or the type of agent plays 
an important role. The greedy agents with a 
longer memory benefit more, while the fair 
agents remain almost the same (since they try to 
be fair anyway), and the generous agents give a 
bit more out (due to their generosity). These 
findings turn out to be robust across a number of 
runs.  
 
Table 5. Impact of memory size. Parameters 
used: Number of plays = 2000, dumb agents 
population size = 90, smart agent population size 
= 20, number of generations = 100. 
 
Experiment 5a 
(M - Mem. Size) 
Experiment 5b 
(M – Mem. Size) 
Agent 
Types 
M=1 M=2 M=1 M=2 
Smart 
w. 
mem. 
33.3 34.1 26.0 23.7 
Smart 
w/o 
mem. 
N/A N/A 29.9 29.0 
Greedy  21.2 22.3 25.7 26.1 
Fair  43.2 42.8 34.7 34.1 
Gen. 20.7 19.6 25.1 25.1 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Future research 
Artificial agents using reinforcement learning 
have been found to be capable of playing the 
ultimatum game efficiently and effectively. 
Agent intelligence and memory have been found 
to have positive impacts on performance. The 
agent-based approach seems consistent with 
human behavior. The work here is a first step 
and sheds light on the design of cooperative 
agent systems in strategic situations in virtual 
communities, especially in electronic commerce 
such as bargaining and negotiations in supply 
chains. 
 
Following the same paradigm, as outlined in 
Kimbrough and Wu (2001), we are actively 
investigating other strategic games, among them 
are two versions of the trust game: “The classical 
economic trust game” vs. “The Mad Mex Game” 
or “The E-Commerce Game”, see Wu, 
Kimbrough and Zhong (2001) for initial results. 
These trust games are natural extensions of, yet 
much more complicated than, the ultimatum 
game as investigated in this paper. However, the 
work reported here served as the initial 
foundation for subsequent work. We plan to 
conduct lab experiments with real agents 
(humans) playing the ultimatum game and the 
trust game, including games in which real agents 
play with our artificial agents. The goals of this 
investigation are several-fold: to validate our 
model here, to test the predictive quality of our 
model, and to explain human decision making 
behavior. Our ultimate goal is to develop a 
(semi)-automated negotiation support system in 
online communities where artificial agents are 
integrated with human beings to support human 
decision making in electronic marketplace.   We 
have reported here some first steps in that 
direction.  Much remains to be done. 
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